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"The health of democracies, of whatever type and range, de-
pends on a wretched technical detail: electoral procedure. All
the rest is secondary."'
(Jose Ortega y Gasset, Spanish Philosopher)
INTRODUCTION
The primary functions of elections are to produce winners, decide
who forms governments, and make the determination of winners and
governments legitimate. 2 Legitimacy requires that governments con-
duct elections in a way that is objectively fair and widely perceived as
fair. Therefore, a central motivation for non-partisan and uniform
system of election administration is "that every citizen, every voter, be
treated equally and have an equal opportunity to participate."
3
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1. JOSE ORTEGA Y GASSET, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 158 (1932). See also TOM
STOPPARD, JUMPERS (1972) ("It's not the voting that's democracy; it's the counting.").
2. Louis MASSICO'rrE, ANDR BLAis & ANTOINE YOSHINAKA, ESTABLISHING THE
RULES OF THE GAME: ELECTION LAwS IN DEMOCRACIES 9 (2004) (citing Richard Nadeau
& Andrd Blais, Accepting the Election Outcome: The Effect of Participation on Losers'
Consent, 23 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 553 (1993)).
3. Jean-Pierre Kingsley, The Administration of Canada's Independent, Non-Parti-
san Approach, 3 ELECTION L.J. 406, 411 n.3 (2004). The National Commission on Fed-
eral Election Reform described the election process this way:
[T]he American people should expect all levels of government to provide a
democratic process that:
* Maintains an accurate list of citizens who are qualified to vote;
* Encourages every eligible voter to participate effectively;
* Uses equipment that reliably clarifies and registers the voter's choices;
" Handles close elections in a foreseeable and fair way;
• Operates with equal effectiveness for every citizen and every community;
and
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The United States frequently appears to fall short of these goals. 4
The highest profile example of this failure is the Florida vote in the
2000 presidential election. 5 Michigan Representative John Conyers
stated, "[o]ur broken electoral system was an accomplice to a magic
trick that would make David Copperfield proud: millions of Americans
went to vote on November 7, 2000, only to have their voice in our de-
mocracy disappear."
6
Problems in Florida spurred the passage of the Help America
Vote Act ("HAVA") in 2002.7 HAVA's purpose was "to establish a pro-
gram to provide funds to States to replace punch card voting systems,
to establish the Election Assistance Commission to assist in the ad-
ministration of Federal elections and to otherwise provide assistance
with the administration of certain Federal election laws and pro-
grams, [as well as] to establish minimum election administration
0 Reflects limited but responsible federal participation.
The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride and Confidence
in the Electoral Process (2001), reprinted in 1 ELECTION L.J. 111, 114 (2002) [hereinafter
National Commission].
4. See VotersUnite.org, Election Problem Log: 2004 Plus, http://www.votersunite.
org/electionproblems2004plus.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2007) (providing a comprehen-
sive overview of problems reported in the media about U.S. elections beginning in 2004);
see also Michael J. Pitts, Heads or Tails? A Modest Proposal For Deciding Close Elec-
tions, 39 CONN. L. REV. 739, 742-45 (2006) (listing numerous U.S. voting problems, in-
cluding "New Mexico: 678 votes lost due to a programming error involving electronic
voting machines in Rio Arriba County. Ohio: the use of punch-card voting systems re-
sulted in the loss of thousands of votes. Pennsylvania: touch-screen voting machines in
Mercer County malfunctioned. Iowa: one hundred voters in Ames were turned away
from a polling place. Wisconsin: 200 felons voted illegally.") (citations omitted); Daniel
P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the
Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1220-39 (2005) (enumerating
problems in the 2004 presidential election); Lillie Coney, A Call for Election Reform, 7
J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 183, 183-84 (2005) (arguing that the failures of the U.S. elec-
tion system necessitate reform). U.S. voting problems are hardly a recent phenomenon.
See JOSEPH P. HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES vii (1934)
(describing the administration of elections as "backward and generally unsatisfactory")
(available for download at http://vote.nist.gov/electionadmin.htm).
5. For some of the voluminous materials produced on the issues in Florida, see
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE (2001); BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND
THE COMMENTARY (E.J. Dionne, Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001); ABNER GREENE, UN-
DERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE
PRESIDENCY (2001); and RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELEC-
TION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001). See also Allan J. Lichtman, What
Really Happened in Florida's 2000 Presidential Election, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 221, 221
(2003) (providing a statistical analysis that concluded there were "wide racial dispari-
ties in ballot rejection rates" in Florida's 2000 presidential election).
6. Press Release, Rep. John Conyers Jr., Conyers Releases First Fifty-State Sur-
vey of Election Irregularities (Aug. 20, 2001), available at http://www.house.gov/cony-
ers/pr082001.htm.
7. Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/votinghava/HAVA.2002.html (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (Supp. II 2002)). Before HAVA, the federal government did not
underwrite states' expenses for elections to federal offices.
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standards for States and units of local government with responsibility
for the administration of Federal elections . .. ."
Notwithstanding the improvements HAVA promised, there were
many voting controversies in the 2004 election. 9 From disenfranchise-
ment in Florida, to eight-hour poll lineups in Ohio, problems marred
the elections.' 0 As Richard L. Hasen observed, "[iun the 2004 presi-
dential election, the United States came much closer to electoral
meltdown, violence in the streets, and constitutional crisis than most
people realize.""' The 2006 midterm elections also had "plenty of
problems" including lost votes, malfunctioning machines and absent
poll workers.' 2
8. HAVA (Preamble), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666. See also HAVA
§ 301(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(5) (providing general voting requirements, including
equipment error guidelines); HAVA § 301(a)(6); 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(6) (requiring that
each state define in advance what qualifies as a vote). Congress' motives underlying the
passage of HAVA are discussed in Leonard Shambon & Keith Abouchar, Trapped by
Precincts? The Help America Vote Act's Provisional Ballots and the Problem of Precincts,
10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 133, 159-66 (2006).
9. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 941 (2005)
(arguing that "[t]he very basis of our democratic system of government-the use of free
and fair elections for the peaceful transfer of power from one administration to the next-
was called into question by concerns over the rules for the casting and counting of votes
and frequent, if often unwarranted, allegations of fraud"); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New
Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689,
697 (2006) ("The 2004 election showed that the work of election reform is far from com-
plete, and studies conducted since then reveal that substantial problems remain."). See
RON BAIMAN, KATHY Dopp, STEVEN F. FREEMAN, BRIAN JOINER, VICTORIA LOVEGREN,
JOSH MITTELDORF, CAMPBELL B. READ, RICHARD G. SHEEHAN, JOHNATHAN SIMON, FRANK
STENGER, PAUL F. VELLEMAN & BRUCE O'DELL, ANALYSIS OF THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION EXIT POLL DISCREPANCIES (2005), http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysis/US/
ExitPolls_2004_Mitofsky-Edison.pdf (providing a scientific analysis); see also MICHAEL
KEEFER, EVIDENCE OF ELECTORAL FRAUD IN THE 2004 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: A
READING LIST (2004), http://opednews.com/keefer_111504_readings.htm (listing a "wide
range of readings on the subject of the integrity-or the lack of integrity-of the [2004]
U.S. presidential election").
10. Hasen, supra note 9, at 944 (arguing that many of the responses to the
problems in Florida in 2000 have "made things worse"). It is also noteworthy that the
rate of election litigation "increased dramatically in the 2004 election." Charles
Anthony Smith & Christopher Shortell, The Suits that Counted: The Judicialization of
Presidential Elections, 6 ELECTION L.J. 251, 251 (2007). See also Tova Andrea Wang,
Competing Values or False Choices: Coming to Consensus on the Election Reform Debate
in Washington State and the Country, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353, 358 (2006) (noting
many "troubling developments, ranging from simple human errors to prosecutable fel-
ony violations of federal law").
11. Hasen, supra note 9, at 938.
12. ELECTIONLINE.ORG, BRIEFING: THE 2006 ELECTION 1 (2006), http://www.election
line.org/Portals/l/Publications/EB15.briefing.pdf. Electionline, a non-partisan organi-
zation, concluded that the 2006 elections had been successful with respect to identifying
winners but had failed in terms of "the individual interest of having each voter's voice
heard." Id. at 4.
2007]
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Obviously, however, the United States is not the only developed
Western democracy. Most of these other countries do not seem to ex-
perience the kind of problems seen in recent years with U.S. elections.
This raises the question whether these countries have not only differ-
ent, but perhaps better approaches to critical election issues. 13 Unfor-
tunately, the "comparative study of the conduct of elections . . .has
been largely neglected." 14
This Article provides a brief overview of some of the major elec-
tion problems experienced in the United States and analyzes varying
approaches taken by other countries facing similar challenges (nota-
bly Canada, Germany, and several other European Union ("EU")
Member States). Additionally this article will discuss international
best practice standards. 15 Overall, the United States could benefit
from the consideration and adoption of some of these approaches.
13. Of course, there are many differences even between developed Western democ-
racies, and processes that work well in one country will not necessarily travel well to
other countries. Michael Maley, for example, has focused on problems in transplanting
the regulatory framework of elections from one country to another. See Michael Maley,
Transplanting Election Regulation, 2 ELECTION L.J. 479 (2003) (focusing on problems
with the transfer of election law to developing countries). Although some of Michael
Maley's points are inapplicable here-by contrast to at least some developing countries,
the United States does have a strong commitment to democracy; stable, established po-
litical parties; well developed institutions; and a predominantly educated electorate-
others are relevant. Id. at 486-9 1. For example, sources of election regulation and "un-
enforceable but well-understood conventions" vary between the United States and other
industrialized democracies. Id. at 481-84. See also Andrew C. Geddis, It's a Game that
Anyone Can Play: Election Laws Around the World, 4 ELECTION L.J. 57, 58 (2005) ("It
may be that attempts to draw lessons from the divergent answers given by two or more
countries to a common problem of (say) electoral regulation will founder on the fact that
the background social conditions in each nation are just too different to allow for any
meaningful evaluation."); DoUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTO-
RAL LAws (1st ed. 1967) (supporting the idea of seeking inspiration in other systems;
providing critical comments); Arend Lijphart, The Political Consequences of Electoral
Laws, 1945-85, 84 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 481 (1990) (providing critical comments on RAE,
supra); see generally, EDGARDO BUSCAGLIA & WILLIAM RATCLIFF, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (2000); Daniel
Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J.
OF COMP. L. 163 (2003).
14. MAssIcOTTE ET AL., supra note 2, at 13. A notable exception is Robert A. Pas-
tor, Improving the U.S. Electoral System: Lessons from Canada and Mexico, 3 ELECTION
L.J. 584 (2004) (identifying possible electoral system reforms). See also Global Initia-
tive to Enfranchise People with Disabilities: Laws and Regulations, http://www.election
access.org/subpages/LawsRegulations.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (listing "election
laws, constitutions and regulations of almost every country and territory in the world"
aimed at achieving the participation of disabled citizens in elections).
15. This article does not examine some of the problems that appear relatively spe-
cific to the United States. Campaign finance, for example, is fundamentally important
to the fairness of elections. However, other countries do not face the restrictions im-
posed by the First Amendment. See MASSICOTrE ET AL., supra note 2 (giving a thorough
descriptive account of the electoral processes in sixty-three democracies); see also AREND
LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN
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Clearly, countries can improve their electoral systems. Canada's
electoral system provides a good case study. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, Canada's electoral system violated basic principles of fairness.
An authoritative study observed that "an election during the first de-
cades after 1867 was a rough game whose rules allowed ample scope
for cheating."16 Yet since that time, Canada has slowly improved its
electoral system to the point where it can make very strong claims to
satisfy the primary election functions.' 7 Important developments in-
cluded the introduction of the secret ballot in 1874, which reduced the
corruption associated with oral voting, and the establishment of the
Chief Electoral Officer position in 1920.18
Of course, we recognize that there are important differences be-
tween the United States and Canada. The legal framework governing
elections in Canada consists of the written constitution, unwritten
conventions (non-legal rules unenforceable in courts), statutes, and
common law. 19 The right to vote in Canada is more firmly established
than in the United States. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court's
majority opinion in Bush v. Gore affirmed that Article II of the U.S.
Constitution does not ensure a right to vote. 20 In contrast, Canada's
Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter") guarantees that "lelvery
citizen has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of
Commons or of a [provincial] legislative assembly .... 21 This right,
like all the rights guaranteed in the Charter, is subject only to "rea-
TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES (1984) (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of
majoritarian versus proportionate voting systems).
16. NORMAN WARD, THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS: REPRESENTATION 248 (2nd
ed. 1963); Worth Robert Miller, Harrison County Methods: Election Fraud in Late Nine-
teenth Century Texas, 7 Locus: REGIONAL AND LOCAL HISTORY 111 (1995), available at
http://clio.missouristate.edu/wrmiller/Populism/texts/harrison-county-methods.htm
(stating the United States also had problems in the 19th Century, and estimated that
nearly 30% of votes were fraudulent in some United States jurisdictions). Miller further
noted that "[firaud also played a prominent role in innumerable Democratic victories in
Congressional and local races, as well." Miller, supra (citations omitted).
17. The following discussion deals with Canadian federal elections, which are ad-
ministered by the federal government. In general, similar claims about fairness can be
made of provincial elections.
18. JOHN C. COURTNEY, ELECTIONS 114 (2004).
19. J. PATRICK BOYER, POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS IN
CANADA 1-2 (1981). See generally, Maley, supra note 13, at 481-83 (describing sources of
election regulation).
20. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) ("The individual citizen has no fed-
eral constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless
and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement
its power to appoint members of the electoral college. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1."); see also
John Anderson, What's Right and Wrong With Democracy in the United States, 3 ELEC-
TION L.J. 404, 404 (2004) (suggesting a 28th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guar-
anteeing the right to vote may now be appropriate).
21. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, § 1, as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 1 (providing that
the rights set forth later in the document, including the right to vote, are "subject only
20071
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sonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society," as indicated in section 1 of the Charter.2 2
Consequently, the right to vote among adult citizens is now virtually
universal. 23
ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS
The United States, in effect, places authority in the hands of
roughly "13,000 sovereign counties and municipalities," each responsi-
ble for election administration. 24 The separate counties and munici-
palities make separate decisions about ballot design, the choice of
voting technology, and the methods for counting votes, interpreting
disputed ballots, and then reporting the results to state offices. 25
Thus demonstrating why "[t]here is probably no other phase of public
administration in the United States which is so badly managed as the
conduct of elections."2 6 In Canada, uniformity is assured because
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society"). See COURTNEY, supra note 18, at 36-38.
22. See Jennifer Smith, The Franchise and Theories of Representative Government,
in DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADA 5 (Michael Cassidy ed.,
1991).
23. For a very accessible history of the franchise in Canada, see CBC Archives,
Voting in Canada: How a Privilege Became a Right, http://archives.cbc.ca/IDD-1-73-
1450/politics-economy/voting-rights/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2008) (describing how wo-
men, Asian-Canadians, the mentally disabled, prisoners, and the homeless obtained the
right to vote).
24. See Robert A. Pastor, Improving the U.S. Electoral System: Lessons from Ca-
nada and Mexico, 3 ELECTION L.J. 584 (2004) (discussing problems with the 2000 elec-
tions and observing that the "U.S. system was 'dysfunctionally decentralized'").
25. See Robert A. Pastor, Introduction: The State of Democracy in North America, 3
ELECTION L.J. 396 (2004); see also KAREN O'CONNOR & LARRY J. SABATO, AMERICAN Gov-
ERNMENT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 505 (2006 ed., Pearson Longman, 2006) (indicating
that there are "over 41,000 voting localities"); Louis MASSICOTTE, ANDRI8 BLAIs & AN-
TOINE YOSHINAKA, ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME: ELECTION LAwS IN DEMOCRA-
CIES 11 (2004) (stating that a broad survey of "democratic" systems notes that only the
United States and Switzerland have sub-national administration of national elections);
3 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). One of the few aspects of voting (in presidential elections) in the
United States that is uniform is the date, i.e. the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
November. Many have argued that having only one day-and a regular work day for
that matter-disenfranchises many eligible voters who cite "scheduling conflicts" and/or
"being too busy" as the main reasons for not making use of their right to vote. This
places the United States among the countries in the world with the lowest voter turn-
out. See also Why Tuesday? Fixing Our Voting System, One Question at a Time, www.
whytuesday.org (last visited Jan. 2, 2008); The National Commission on Federal Elec-
tion Reform, To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process (2001), reprinted
in 1 ELECTION L.J. 111, 116 (2002) [hereinafter National Commission] (recommending
that congressional elections should be held on a national holiday).
26. Ray Martinez III, Greater Impartiality in Election Administration: Prudent
Steps Toward Improving Voter Confidence, 5 ELECTION L.J. 235, 240 (2006) (concluding
"the truth of the matter is that the whole administration-organization, laws, methods
and procedures, and records-are, for most states, quite obsolete. The whole system,
including the election laws, requires a thorough revision and improvement").
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Elections Canada, an agency the Chief Electoral Officer oversees, cen-
trally manages these functions.
Moreover, unlike the secretaries of state who oversee U.S. elec-
tions, the Chief Electoral Officer and Elections Canada staff are public
servants independent from partisan politicians and are given the task
of ensuring that elections are administered fairly.2 7 Elections Ca-
nada's functions include implementing and enforcing the relevant
laws, monitoring election spending, maintaining voters lists, training
returning officers who oversee elections in specific constituencies, and
assisting commissioners responsible for drawing electoral boundaries.
In order to maintain a non-partisan agency, the Chief Electoral Of-
ficer and the chiefs assistant are not permitted to vote in federal elec-
tions.28 The appointments have, in practice, been approved by all
parties in Parliament. The procedures for dismissing the Chief Elec-
toral Officer are as difficult as those for a judge; thus assuring their
independence.29
However, the fact that Canada has a uniform nationwide system
for the mechanics of elections goes only part way to explaining the
problems in the United States: it facilitates fairer elections but is not
sufficient. In Germany, another federal state, we find the co-existence
of a multitude of regulatory and administrative regimes. Each of the
sixteen states that comprise the Federal Republic of Germany main-
tains its own election laws for state-wide, regional, and municipal
elections. Differences in the state election laws can be substantial,
including whether or not elections are entirely paper-based, entirely
by voting machines, or a mix of both methods. However, the national
elections-federal elections and the elections to the European Parlia-
ment which are also held nationwide-are governed by uniform laws
and procedures. 30 Moreover, similar to Canada, the nationwide elec-
27. Jean-Pierre Kingsley, The Administration of Canada's Independent, Non-Parti-
san Approach, 3 ELECTION L.J. 406, 406 (2004).
28. See Jennifer Smith, The Franchise and Theories of Representative Government,
in DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADA 6 (Michael Cassidy ed.,
1991); Cecile Boucher, Administration and Enforcement of Electoral Legislation in Ca-
nada, in DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADA (Michael Cassidy ed.,
1991).
29. MASSiCOTrE ET AL., supra note 25, at 97; Kingsley, supra note 27, at 406.
30. See generally GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution], available at http://www.
bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahl2005/downloads/ggauszug.pdf (specifically, see Ar-
ticle 9 (freedom of association), Article 21 (political parties), Article 38 (principles of free
and democratic elections), Article 39 (foundations of the Federal Parliament), and Arti-
cle 41 (procedure in case of challenges of election results)). See also Bundeswahlgesetz
[BWG] [Federal Election Law], July 23, 1993, BGB1. I at 1594, 1288, last amended by
Gesetz, Mar. 11, 2005, BGBI. I at 674 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundeswahl
leiter.de/bundestagswahl2005/downloads/bwg-standmaerz05.pdf (covering the electoral
system); Bundeswahlordnung [BWOI [Federal Election Regulation], Apr. 19, 2002,
BGB1. I at 1376, last amended by Verordnung, June 30, 2005, BGB1. I at 1951 (F.R.G.),
2007]
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tions to the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) and to the European Par-
liament are overseen and organized by one independent officer
(Bundeswahlleiter) and the independent officer's staff of non-partisan
public servants. Similar administrative structures exist within the
several states with the offices of the Landeswahlleiter. 3 1
THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Democracy was a concern to few in pre-confederation Canada.32
For many decades after confederation, Canada saw many limits on the
right to vote in various ways that would be unacceptable, and indeed
unimaginable, from a contemporary perspective. When Canada be-
came independent in 1867, the franchise was restricted to men at
least twenty-one years of age who owned property. In addition to
qualifications based on gender and property ownership, there have
been various restrictions on the voting rights of aboriginals and
Canadians of Asian origin. Voting rights were also somewhat uneven,
as eligibility rules varied from province to province and property qual-
ifications varied within provinces from 1867 to 1885 and again after
1898. Canada's 1885 reforms emphasized property qualifications and
allowed some owners to vote more than once in different constituen-
cies. 3 3 Inconsistencies between provinces remained along with dubi-
ous restrictions.
available at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahl2005/downloads/bundes
wo.pdf (dealing with voter lists, absentee ballots, etc.); Parteiengesetz [PartG] [Federal
Law on Political Parties], Jan. 31, 1994, BGBl. I at 149, last amended by Gesetzes, Dec.
22, 2004, BGB1. at 3673, art. 2 (F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/
bundestagswahl2005/downloads/parteieng.pdf (addressing political party functioning,
internal organization, public financing, etc.); Wahlpriifungsgesetz [WPG] [Federal Law
on Scrutiny of Elections], Apr. 28, 1995, BGB1. III at 582, art. 1, § 111-2 (F.R.G.), availa-
ble at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahl2005/downloads/wahlpruefg.pdf
(describing procedures for determining the validity of an election); Bundeswahlger-
ateverordnung [BWahlGVI [Federal Regulation on Voting Machines], Sept. 3, 1975,
BGB1. I at 2459, last amended by Vorordnung, Apr. 20, 1999, BGB1. I at 749, art. 1
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahl2005/downloads
BWahlGVStand20041999_GESAMT.pdf (regulating electronic voting machines and
software). Unofficial translations into English of Germany's Federal Constitution and
Federal Election Law can be found at German Law Archive, http://www.iuscomp.org
gla/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
31. See, e.g. Deutsche Wahlgesetze, http://www.wahlrecht.de/gesetze.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 28, 2007) (providing links to the legislative provisions on the state, regional,
and municipal level and the offices of the "Landeswahlleiter" in the sixteen states).
32. J. PATRICK BOYER, POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS IN
CANADA 3 (1981) (citation omitted).
33. J. PATRICK BOYER, 1 ELECTION LAW IN CANADA: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF
FEDERAL, PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL ELECTIONS 385-86 (1987); NORMAN WARD, THE
CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS: REPRESENTATION 216-17, 220 (2nd ed. 1963); CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT, A HISTORY OF THE VOTE IN CANADA 45 (1997).
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Full federal control of voting rights in federal elections was not
established until the Dominion Elections Act of 1920.3 4 Likewise, in
Germany, the constitution did not guarantee the right to vote in fed-
eral elections until 1949, and currently the Federal Electoral Law
specifies under what circumstances a person loses the right to vote.3 5
An unusually partisan treatment of voting rights in Canada oc-
curred when the Canadian government altered eligibility rules in or-
der to bolster the wartime government's prospects of re-election in
1917. The government enfranchised women who were related to men
fighting in World War I, and servicemen's votes were taken by appoin-
tees of the government; at the same time, the government stripped
conscientious objectors of their voting rights, along with British sub-
jects born in, or who spoke the language of, a hostile country.3 6 A
more recent instance of the franchise growing more restrictive oc-
curred in 1975 when the right to vote was taken from non-citizens who
were British subjects.3 7
In other respects, Canada has gradually moved toward a wider
franchise, granting voting rights to women in 1918, and eliminating
restrictions based on property, religion (e.g. restrictions affecting
Doukhobors' voting rights until 1960) and race (e.g. the right to vote
has been denied at certain times to Japanese Canadians and aborigi-
nal people).38 In addition, Canada lowered the voting age from
twenty-one to eighteen in 1970. More recently, following court rulings
based on section 3 of the Charter, voting rights have expanded to in-
clude people with mental disabilities and, in several stages, to prison-
ers.3 9 Unlike Canada, most U.S. states deny voting rights to
34. TERENCE H. QUALTER, THE ELECTION PROCESS IN CANADA 3 (1970). See also
WARD, supra note 33, at 214.
35. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 38, §2 ("Anyone who has attained
the age of eighteen years is entitled to vote; anyone who has attained majority is eligible
for election."); Grundgesetz [GG] [Constitution] art. 13 [Federal Electoral Law] ("A per-
son shall be disqualified from voting if (1) he or she is not eligible to vote owing to a
judicial decision, (2) a custodian has been appointed not only through a restraining or-
der to attend to all his or her affairs; this also applies when the custodian's sphere of
duties does not include the affairs set forth in Article 1896(4) and Article 1905 of the
Civil Code, (3) he or she is accommodated in a psychiatric hospital under an order pur-
suant to Article 63 of the Penal Code.").
36. BOYER, supra note 32, at 132-33; WARD, supra note 33, at 179-81, 226-27; JOHN
C. COURTNEY, ELECTIONS 115 (2004).
37. Munroe Eagles, The Franchise and Political Participation in Canada, in CANA-
DIAN PARTIES IN TRANSITION 307, 311 (A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon eds., 2nd
ed., Scarborough: Nelson, 1996); BOYER, supra note 32, at 314-15.
38. COURTNEY, supra note 36, at 34 (women); BOYER, supra note 32, at 134 (relig-
ion); WARD, supra note 33, at 230 (race).
39. See Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 3, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (stating that "[e]very citi-
zen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons
or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein."); Canadian
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prisoners, and seven states do not automatically restore prisoner vot-
ing rights after a sentence is served. 40 In Canada, the only remaining
significant restriction applies to people who have not yet turned eigh-
teen, and there have even been proposals to reduce the voting age to
sixteen.4 1 The nationwide uniformity in modern Canada and Ger-
many contrasts with the United States, where the right to vote in U.S.
national elections has always been determined by states, which are
modestly constrained by only a few national requirements in the Bill
of Rights such as Amendments XIX, XXIV, and XXVI. 42
VOTER LISTS AND REGISTRATION
According to a 2001 report by The CalTech/MIT Voting Technol-
ogy Project, the "Census Bureau estimated that in the 2000 election
Disability Rights Council v. Can., [1988] 3 F.C. 622; Sauv6 v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R.
519. Canada is one of four countries which allows mentally challenged people to vote.
See Louis MAsSICOIrE, ANDRA BLAis & ANTOINE YOSHINAKA, ESTABLISHING THE RULES
OF THE GAME: ELECTION LAws IN DEMOCRACIES 27 (2004) (surveying sixty-three
countries).
40. ANDREW GUMBEL, STEAL THIS VOTE: DIRTY ELECTIONS AND THE ROTrTEN His-
TORY OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 47 (2005); COURTNEY, supra note 36, at 38 (citing
Christian R. Grose & Antoine Yoshinaka, Electoral Institutions and Voter Participa-
tion: The Effect of Felon Disenfranchisement Laws on Voter Turnout in the U.S. South-
ern States (2002) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political
Science Association)). See Robert A. Pastor, Improving the U.S. Electoral System: Les-
sons from Canada and Mexico, 3 ELECTION L.J. 584, n.3 (2004) (estimating that if
America allowed felons to vote as Canada does, four million people would be affected);
Making Votes Count: Felons and the Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, at A12
(reporting that nearly five million Americans are ineligible to vote due to prior felony
convictions); see also The National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure
Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process (2001), reprinted in 1 ELECTION L.J. 111,
117 (2002) [hereinafter National Commission] (recommending that felons should be per-
mitted to vote after serving their sentence).
41. The only other restrictions on the right to vote in Canada affect the Chief Elec-
toral Officer and the Assistant Chief Electoral Officer. ALAIN PELLETIER (WITH THE AS-
SISTANCE OF MARIE-EvE POULIN, NATHALIE NYE, TIM MOWNEY, MARC TASCHEREAU,
JAIME ALIAGA, GALLO, CHRISTINE MOREAU-TREMBLAY, JEAN-SEBASTIEN BARGIEL & MAR-
TIN LAVOIE), COMPENDIUM OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN CANADA: A COMPARATIVE
OVERVIEW, tbl. Part.D.3 (2002), http://www.elections.ca/loi/com2002/comp2002-e.pdf.
The United States has also seen a discussion of a lowering of the voting age to sixteen.
See Pam Belluck, Sixteen Candles, but Few Blazing a Trail to the Ballot Box, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007 at 3 (reporting that countries such as Austria allow voting at age
sixteen).
42. Under the Constitution, Congress may regulate federal elections. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (stating that although each State's legislature shall prescribe the
'Times, Places, and Manner of Holding Elections for Senators and Representatives...
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Place of chusing Senators."); see also U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 3 (declaring "the Con-
gress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors and the Day on which they shall
give their Votes"). The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are also used to permit
Congress to regulate state or local elections on equal protection and due process
grounds. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); S. C. v. Katzenback, 383 U.S. 301
(1966).
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three million registered voters did not vote because of problems with
their registration."4 3 Given this problem and the related problem of
eligible but unregistered voters, HAVA requires that
[e] ach state . . .shall implement, in a uniform and nondis-
criminatory manner, a single, uniform, official, centralized,
interactive computerized statewide voter registration list de-
fined, maintained, and administered at the State level that
contains the name and registration information of every le-
gally registered voter in the State and assigns a unique iden-
tifier to each legally registered voter in the State .. . 44
HAVA's success remains uncertain and does not inspire confi-
dence. 4 5 In 2005, Hasen wrote, "[no rational election administrator
would design the current hyperfederalized and non-intuitive system of
voter registration."46 There are two prime risks if the voter registra-
tion system is not working: eligible voters may be denied the right to
vote (vote denial) or may vote more than once (vote dilution). With
respect to the first risk, electoral jurisdictions frequently have diffi-
cult, non-intuitive "rules for registration - from how to fill out the
forms, to where the forms are available, to what information must be
put on the forms, to the deadlines for registration."4 7 In addition,
there may be technical requirements, such as the allowable weight of
the paper or the need for voters to provide duplicate information. 48
43. CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT IS AND WHAT
COULD BE 27 (2001), http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documentsjulyOl/JulyOlVTP_
VotingReportEntire.pdf.
44. Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666,
1708 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (Supp. I 2002)). HAVA also attempts to
solve some of the registration problems by giving potentially eligible voters the right to
cast a provisional ballot. HAVA § 302, 42 U.S.C. §15482.
45. See, e.g., Lillie Coney, A Call for Election Reform, 7 J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGES
183, 185 (2005) ("Poor administration of the voter registration lists, inadequate training
of election workers, poorly implemented third party registration efforts, abuse of public
access to voter registration data, and bogus felony purge lists, all contributed to the
disenfranchisement of millions of American citizens in 2004.").
46. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 964 (2005).
See also Gabrielle B. Ruda, Picture Perfect: A Critical Analysis of the Debate on the 2002
Help America Vote Act, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 235 (2003).
47. Hasen, supra note 46, at 964. At one time these difficult requirements were
justified on the basis of limiting those people who were eligible to vote. See id. Further,
"[t]hose who overcome the annual hurdle of registering at a time remote to the fall elec-
tions will more likely be better informed and have greater capabilities of making an
intelligent choice than those who do not care enough to register." Id. (quoting the Texas
Attorney General in Beare v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 1100, 1106 (S.D. Tex. 1971)). See also
Coney, supra note 45, at 190 (stating that "[almong the registration form problems
faced by voters in 2004 who wished to register to vote included state applications that
were cluttered with text, asked the same question multiple times, and challenged a
voter's right to privacy while the form was in transit to the registrar's office").
48. Hasen, supra note 46, at 964-65.
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Lillie Coney goes so far as to suggest that "[t]he key to free and fair
elections may lie in the design of voter registration forms."49
In addition, problems arise in the creation of voter lists. Private
contractors are often involved in the creation of voter lists, and politi-
cal parties may pay them by the name.50 Eligible voters might effec-
tively lose the ability to vote if political groups destroy the registration
forms of those predicted to vote for the other party.5 1 Moreover, this
"bounty hunter" system likely encourages voter fraud, as with the re-
gistration forms submitted with names of fictional characters, like
Mary Poppins, Dick Tracy, or Jive Turkey Sr., or with eligible voters
registering (and then voting) in multiple locations.5 2 There certainly
were numerous examples in the 2004 election of people registered in
multiple locations. In Indiana, for example, thousands of voters were
registered incorrectly, including both deceased individuals and indi-
viduals registered in multiple counties. 53 There were also numerous
instances of problems with voter lists. For example, voter registration
lists in counties in Ohio and West Virginia had higher numbers of reg-
istered voters than the estimated population of voting age residents in
the counties. 54
Even if voters have correctly registered to vote, states may still
remove ("purge") their names from the voter lists. 55 Many states
"compile their purge lists without reference to any legislative stan-
dards whatsoever, while half the states surveyed do so using only an
49. Coney, supra note 45, at 190.
50. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTION OFFICIALS, ELECTION 2004: REVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE NATION'S ELECTION ADMINISTRATORS 12-13 (2005), http:f/
www.electioncenter.org/documents/Task%20Force%2OFinal%20PDF.pdf. See also NA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTION OFFICIALS, INTRODUCTION & PURPOSE OF THE NA-
TIONAL TASK FORCE (2001), http'J/www.electioncenter.org/publications/electionrefort
report2001.pdf (describing problems with the United States voter registration system
and recommending solutions).
51. Hasen, supra note 46, at 967. See also Coney, supra note 45, at 195 (reporting
examples of voter registration forms being discarded or not being sent to the
government).
52. Hasen, supra note 46, at 967. See also Coney, supra note 45, at 195, 197 (dis-
cussing third party and invalid voter registrations). Multiple registration, by itself, is
not necessarily evidence of voter fraud. Id. at 187-88.
53. John Strauss & Mark Nichols, 11,214 on Rolls in 2 Counties, THE INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Oct. 28, 2004, at Al (reporting that a former Indiana governor, then deceased,
was included among the registered voters). See also Coney, supra note 45, at 188 (re-
porting additional examples of newspaper reports of multiple registrations, including
Florida, the Carolinas, Kansas, and Missouri).
54. Coney, supra note 45, at 189.
55. See generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PURGED! HOW A PATCHWORK OF
FLAWED AND INCONSISTENT VOTING SYSTEMS COULD DEPRIVE MILLIONS OF AMERICANS OF
THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2004), http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/purged%20-voting-report.pdf
(describing how states unevenly conduct purges, even when the underlying disen-
franchisement policies are the same).
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individual's name and address."56 Moreover, states that deny con-
victed felons the right to vote frequently have failed to codify the crite-
ria necessary to ensure that the voter being removed from the list is
the same person as the one convicted of the felony. 57 Finally, many
states do not require the notification of voters purged from voter lists,
thereby reducing the likelihood of the voter challenging incorrect
removal. 58
Composition of voter lists proved to be a problem in Florida, as
before the 2000 election a private contractor helped purge the voter
lists of felons, and mistakenly removed up to 8000 eligible voters.59 In
2004, a different private contractor failed to notice the list of felons to
be purged from the voter lists included 2100 people who had won
clemency, and thus the right to vote, while very few Hispanic names
were on the purge list.60 Hispanics in Florida generally vote Republi-
can, whereas many of the people wrongly included on the list were
African Americans, who generally vote Democratic. 61 Composition of
voter lists was also a problem in the high-profile 2004 Washington gu-
bernatorial election, with "allegations of ineligible voters, including
felons and non-registrants, casting votes."62
Canada had similar problems with voter registration. Until
roughly 1900, opposing parties frequently battled more over voter lists
than the actual elections. The franchise in Canada during the late
nineteenth century was not so much what the law said it was, but
rather the presence of one's name on an accepted voter list.63 Not only
did considerable partisan manipulation of voter lists occur, but Ca-
nada did not fully establish its process of enumeration until 1938.64
Following the call of an election (election dates are not fixed as in the
56. Id. at 2-3.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2-4 (identifying "myriad structural and procedural flaws" in states' struc-
tures and procedures).
59. Hasen, supra note 46, at 965-66.
60. Lesley Clark, List Abandoned, but Doubts Linger, MII HERALD, July 11, 2004
at 21A; Joshua Kurlantzick, 2000, The Sequel, AM. PROSPECT. Sept. 19, 2004, at 22.
Although both African Americans and Hispanics comprise roughly 10% of Florida's pop-
ulation, only 61 of nearly 48,000 named felons were Hispanic, and approximately 22,000
were African American. Id.
61. See id.
62. Hasen, supra note 46, at 968-69. Even leaving aside the question of eligibility,
it remains astonishing that only two-thirds of eligible U.S. voters are actually registered
to vote. Furthermore, the United States in a worldwide comparison of some 180 coun-
tries that conduct national elections ranks 139th in voter turnout over the last fifty-
eight years. John Anderson, What's Right and Wrong with Democracy in the United
States, 3 ELECTION L.J. 404, 404 (2004).
63. NORMAN WARD, THE CANADIAN HousE OF COMMONS: REPRESENTATION 189 (2nd
ed. 1963).
64. Id. at 196.
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United States), temporary state employees gathered names door to
door in each riding.65 The system was credited with registering 95 to
97.5% of voters. 66 Norman Ward confidently praised the system, ob-
serving that if individuals are primarily responsible for registering to
vote, as in the United States, the likely result is a list with more omis-
sions and in which younger citizens are disproportionately excluded. 6 7
After the 1997 election, a permanent voter list, perhaps more ac-
curately called "a continuously maintained roll of electors," replaced
this system of enumeration. 68 Elections Canada assembles the list by
using a range of sources including citizenship applications, provincial
voter lists, tax returns, and driver's licenses; voters can also register
directly or on election day.69 One academic study indicates that the
system managed to include 93.1% of the eligible population in 2000, a
slightly weaker performance than enumeration. 70 Another study in-
dicates that it is premature to assess the new system, yet is hopeful
that it will ultimately prove satisfactory. 7 1 Neither study suggests
any deliberate manipulation; instead, they believe the new machinery
may be less efficient than enumeration and certain groups may be dis-
65. JOHN C. COURTNEY, ELECTIONS 79, 85 (2004).
66. Id. at 80.
67. WARD, supra note 63, at 204. See G. Bingham Powell, Jr., American Voter
Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 80 Am. POL. Sci. REV. (1986) (analyzing the low
rates of registration in the United States); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
WHY AMERICANS STILL DON'T VOTE (Pantheon 1988); see also TERENCE H. QUALTER, THE
ELECTION PROCESS IN CANADA 22 (1970) (describing the enumeration system as "highly
effective"); Hugh Segal, The Costs of Partisan Disengagement: the Mounting Demo-
cratic Debt (Sept. 16, 2004), http://www.canadiandemocraticmovement.ca/Article443.
html (commenting that "[diuring the 1960's, many American civil rights workers would
have been overwhelmed by this Canadian practice of going out to find voters and mak-
ing sure that they were on the voters list in comparison to the very different American
system of voter registration."). The enumeration system, two political scientists indi-
cated in 1991, appears to have operated "without major instance of public or private
willful abuse." John C. Courtney & David E. Smith, Registering Voters: Canada in a
Comparative Context, in DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADA 433
(Michael Cassidy ed., 1991).
68. John Courtney, Reforming Representational Building Blocks: Canada at the
Beginning of the Twenty-first Century, in POLITICAL PARTIES, REPRESENTATION, AND
ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IN CANADA 119 (William Cross ed., 2002).
69. Courtney, supra note 65, at 85. Enumeration is still done in certain areas, such
as new neighborhoods and locations with large numbers of tenants. Beyond the ques-
tion of eligibility, there is the question of whether an individual gets on a voters' list.
The right to get on the voters' list on Election Day exists today, but this has only been
recently established for all ridings-there was a period when the right only existed in
rural ridings.
70. Jerome H. Black, From Enumeration to the National Register of Electors: An
Account and an Evaluation, in STRENGTHENING CANADIAN DEMOCRACY (Paul Howe,
Richard Johnston & Andre Blais eds., 2005), also in 9 CHOICES 21, available at http:fl
www.irpp.org/choices/archive/vol9no7.pdf.
71. COURTNEY, supra note 65, at 161.
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proportionally excluded. 7 2 With no significant limits on the right to
vote and non-partisan control of the voter lists there is little danger of
selective disenfranchisement as has occurred in U.S. states.
7 3
The German system, based on mandatory residence lists, has also
been successful at enabling fair elections. Every person spending 186
days or more per year in Germany-who is therefore subject to univer-
sal income taxation under German law-must maintain no more and
no less than one primary residence in the country. The respective lo-
cal authorities are charged with the maintenance of various records on
that person, and he or she can only apply for a national identification
card, a driver's license or a passport at the place of the primary resi-
dence. A new primary residence will only be registered in one place if
the applicant presents a document from the authorities of the previous
place of residence showing the de-listing of the person at that location.
With various administrative controls and severe penalties for fraud,
the system results in highly accurate population registers, which, to-
gether with information about citizenship, are then used, inter alia, to
compile the voter lists. On election day, voters have to show up at
their neighborhood voting station and identify themselves with either
their passport or their national identification card. Germany's use of
a national identification card is straightforward, but difficult for coun-
tries that lack such a system to emulate. In addition, German author-
ities had to find solutions for eligible voters who had their primary
residence outside the country. German citizens living abroad can ap-
ply in the county of their last German residence to be included in the
voter list. This is done by submission of a special form, together with
a written affirmation of voter eligibility in lieu of an oath. Although
the forms are widely available on the internet and from German em-
bassies, their use by eligible citizens abroad has been limited. Never-
theless, no evidence suggests that significant problems with vote
denial or vote dilution exist in Germany.
Hasen, among others, has supported the idea of a national, uni-
versal registration system in the United States.74 Hasen notes that if
other entities are required to provide appropriate information, the fed-
72. See Black, supra note 70, at 32-33.
73. See ANDREW GUMBEL, STEAL THIS VOTE: DIRTY ELECTIONS AND THE ROTTEN His-
TORY OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 211-13 (2005) (discussing disenfranchisement in Flor-
ida); see also LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAw, SHATTERING THE
MYTH: AN INITIAL SNAPSHOT OF VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE 2004 ELECTIONS
(2004), http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/dfiles/file_477.pdf (enumerating numerous difficulties
with minority voter registration in the last two presidential elections).
74. Hasen, supra note 46, at 970 (recommending that "[tlhe federal government-
perhaps the Department of the Census-should undertake the universal registration of
eligible voters, and issue each voter a voter identification card that contains a name,
signature, photograph, and biometric identification (such as a fingerprint)").
20071
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
eral government could maintain an up-to-date voter list. For exam-
ple, the U.S. Postal Service could provide data from its change of
address forms, and local organizations could provide data from death
certificates. 7 5 The states' different voter eligibility rules would, how-
ever, remain an issue.
VOTING AND COUNTING
The de facto delegation of vote counting to the private companies
supplying the voting machines, such as Election Systems & Software
("ES & S"), Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Sys-
tems), and Sequoia remains an interesting specialty of the U.S. demo-
cratic system.76 By and large these companies tabulate the votes
behind closed doors without effective monitoring, and sometimes even
without any monitoring by non-partisan officials and/or concerned cit-
izens. 77 By contrast, Canada and European countries typically count
their votes in public, under the critical eyes of representatives of the
parties competing in the elections.
According to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, the aver-
age age of U.S. poll workers is seventy-two.78 Although the high aver-
age age could stand for many years of experience, and thus, be a good
thing, it has more likely contributed to problems in recent elections
because of complicated and non-uniform ballot design and widespread
use of voting machines for which poll workers had received little train-
ing.79 Dan Seligson, editor of an election monitoring group, notes that
75. Hasen, supra note 46, at 971.
76. See generally, Mark Crispin Miller, Keynote Speech, 30 SEA2rLE U. L. REV.
1019, 1021 (2007) (observing that "for-profit private corporations-private vendors-
literally run the electoral process in over eighty percent of the counties in the United
States"). See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic
Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1717-24 (2005) (describing the types of voting equip-
ment currently used in the United States); see also Susan M. Boland & Therese Clarke
Arado, 0 Brave New World? Electronic Voting Machines and Internet Voting: An Anno-
tated Bibliography, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 313 (2007) (providing an annotated list of refer-
ences to post-2000 materials).
77. In some cases, such as counting votes entered on paperless, touch-screen ma-
chines, monitoring may be "literally impossible." Miller, supra note 76, at 1021. As
Miller observes, "There is nothing to count after votes are cast. We simply have to take
the corporation's word that the numbers are what the corporation claims they are." Id.
This is also troubling, given that the four largest companies also have links to the Re-
publican Party. Id.
78. See Jim Drinkard, Panel Cites Poll Workers'Age as Problem, USA TODAY, Aug.
8, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/2004-08-08-
voting-workers.x.htm (reporting federal election officials believed "the potential for con-
fusion and mistakes" by U.S. poll workers was the "biggest threat" to the 2004 election).
79. HAVA includes a section on poll worker training. See Help America Vote Act
(HAVA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 254(a), 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 15301-15545 (Supp. II 2002)).
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"[iut's almost become a specialized job."8 0 A survey of poll workers for
the 2006 Ohio primary found that more than half of the respondents
"did not feel that their training gave them sufficient information to do
their job well," and older poll workers expressed the least familiarity
or comfort with computers.8 '
There is also a shortage of qualified poll workers.8 2 As Curtis
Gans, director of the Center for the Study of the American Electorate
at American University in Washington, observed "[m]ost of the poll
workers are older people, and they're dying off."8 3 New workers are
less interested, in part because of very low wages.8 4 At least one
lawmaker has proposed requiring citizens to serve at the polls in the
same way citizens are required to serve on a jury, and one county,
Douglas County, Nebraska, already uses a conscript system.8 5 The
lawmaker's proposal also provides for two days of training for election
workers.
In 2000, another fundamental problem in Florida was the lack of
a clear standard for what constituted a valid vote.8 6 This was the root
cause for subsequent debates about the status of overvotes and chads
that were hanging, dimpled, or pregnant.8 7 Different technologies for
voting vary in their capacity to successfully translate voters' intent
into valid votes; the method used affects the rate of spoiled ballots.
Five different voting methods were used in the 2000 presidential elec-
tion, and it was not uncommon to have different systems used within
the same state. 88 Moreover, in many cases, there was no paper trail
80. Bob Driehaus, Official Proposes 'Drafting' Poll Workers to Ease Problems, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/27/us/27voting.html
?_r=l&oref=slogin.
81. See DEMOS BRIEFING PAPER SERIES, CHALLENGES TO FAIR ELECTIONS: POLL
WORKER TRAINING, (2006), http://www.demos.org/pubs/CFE-pollworker_102506.pdf (as-
serting that "[sitates squeak by each year with a bare minimum of poll workers who
receive inadequate training for an increasingly complex task").
82. See, e.g., Rachel Konrad, Poll Worker Shortage Has Voters Bracing for Long
Lines, Confusion, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 31, 2004 (reporting an expected shortage of
500,000 poll workers).
83. Driehaus, supra note 80.
84. Poll workers frequently receive less than fast food workers. See DEMOS BRIEF-
ING PAPER SERIES, supra note 81 (comparing poll workers' wages with those of fast food
restaurant employees).
85. See Driehaus, supra note 80.
86. Robert A. Pastor, Improving the U.S. Electoral System: Lessons from Canada
and Mexico, 3 ELECTION L.J. 591 (2004).
87. In Florida, each county's canvassing board had discretion to determine whether
a ballot adequately indicated the voter's intent. See FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5)(c) (2000)
(stating that "if a counting team is unable to determine whether the ballot contains a
clear indication that the voter has made a definite choice, the ballot shall be presented
to the county canvassing board for a determination.").
88. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere, Voting Machines, Race, and Equal Protection,
1 ELECTION L.J. 61, 67 (2002) (providing the following figures: Direct Recording Elec-
tronic Machines (DRE) 11.7%; lever 18.1%; paper 1.4%; punch 38.1%; and scanner
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and therefore manual recounts were impossible if the count was ques-
tioned.8 9 Interestingly, African-American voters were disproportion-
ately likely to live in the jurisdictions using "inferior technology."90
These problems are unsolved and undermine the legitimacy of elec-
tions in the United States.
Canada largely avoids these difficulties. Canada does not have
computer failure problems because its elections use paper ballots. 9 1
Paper ballots likely minimize opportunities for cheating.9 2 In the four
American presidential elections preceding 2004, punch card systems
failed to count 2.5% of the ballots cast, and electronic voting machines
failed to count an average of 2.3% of ballots. 9 3 Paper ballots were
more secure and lent themselves to fewer errors.9 4 This is supported
by Canadian experience. For example, in Canada's 2004 and 2006
federal elections, just 0.9% and 0.6%, respectively, of ballots were re-
30.8%.); Voting Systems 2007, http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/vot-
ing%2OSystems%202007.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2008) (providing a complete list of
voting systems used in the United States).
89. See ANDREW GUMBEL, STEAL THIS VOTE: DIRTY ELECTIONS AND THE ROTTEN His-
TORY OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270, 280 (2005).
90. Ansolabehere, supra note 88, at 64, 65. See also DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST
ELECTIONS 58 (2002) (citing SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H.
PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 307-09
(2nd rev. ed. 2001)).
91. Robert A. Pastor, America Observed: Why Foreign Election Observers Would
Rate the United States Near the Bottom, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Dec. 20, 2004. Only
eight of sixty-two countries examined in a recent survey employ electronic voting or
voting machines; the rest use paper ballots. Louis MASsICOrrE, ANDRIP BLu's & AN-
TOINE YOSHINAKA, ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF THE GAME: ELECTION LAWS IN DEMOCRA-
CIES 124-25 tbl. 5.3 (2004). Canadian provincial elections also use paper ballots. See,
e.g., Elections Ontario, http://www.elections.on.ca/en-CA/Voters/WhatHappensWhenl
Vote/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2008) (describing voting procedures). This is not to say that
paper ballots are without risks. Election Canada, for example, lists on its website as a
frequently asked question, "[ius someone allowed to eat a ballot?" Elections Canada:
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.elections.ca/content.asp?section=faq&docu-
ment=faqvoting&lang=e&textonly=false#votingl (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). (For the
curious, the answer is no pursuant to section 167(2)(a) of the Canada Elections Act. Id.)
Elections Canada claims, however, that its "system to control all ballots is recognized
worldwide as being at the forefront of measures aimed at preventing electoral fraud."
Id.
92. J. PATRICK BOYER, 2 ELECTION LAW IN CANADA: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF
FEDERAL, PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL ELECTIONS 750 (1987) [hereinafter BOYER, THE
LAW AND PROCEDURE]. Miller likewise notes that paper ballots are preferable because
"after an election, one can theoretically count the paper ballots and verify the results,"
but observes that some U.S. jurisdictions, like Florida, have made illegal such hand
counts after an election. Miller, supra note 76, at 1022.
93. See CALTECHfMIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT IS AND WHAT
COULD BE 21 (2001), http://www.vote.caltech.edu/medialdocuments/julyOl/JulyOlVTP_
VotingReportEntire.pdf.
94. Id. (concluding that "[o]ptically scanned paper and hand-counted paper ballots
have consistently shown the best average performance").
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jected. 95 Moreover, Canada uses uniform ballots. Simple and uniform
ballots minimize voters' errors. Ballots are relatively easy to count
and any contentious points that appeared in the past have already
been litigated, leaving less room for ambiguity.
After the elections in 2000, Florida courts considered the legality
of a manual recount.9 6 The recount process was not adequately estab-
lished before the election. 97 Rather, under Florida law each county
had a county canvassing board, which in some circumstances had the
discretion to order a recount.98 In 1874, Canada established the prac-
tice that judges resolve disputed procedures. 9 9 In Canada, many im-
portant court cases resolving electoral disputes had been decided by
1920.100 Compared with the United States, Canada's recount proce-
dures and rules for disallowing controverted results are straightfor-
ward and unambiguous. 10 1 Electoral disputes in Canada are now
primarily technical exercises with relatively little judicial discretion.
In this context, it is also relevant that Canadian and European courts
are generally less partisan than American courts, which likely leads to
the fairer resolution of election disputes.
ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES
In the United States there have been many reports of problems
with electronic voting machines and numerous court challenges. 10 2
Doug Chapin provides a long list of problems that occurred in the 2004
95. See Elections Canada, http://www.elections.ca/scripts/OVR2004/default.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (providing Official Voting Results for the 2004 Election);
Elections Canada, http://www.elections.ca/scripts/OVR2006/default.html (last visited
Oct. 16, 2007) (providing Official Voting Results for the 2006 Election). A portion of
these ballots presumably were deliberately spoiled in both Canada and the United
States.
96. See, e.g., Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.
2000) (per curiam), vacated sub nom., Bush v. Palm Beach County Cavassing Bd., 531
U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam); Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla. 2000),
affd, 234 F.3d 1163 (l1th Cir. 2000); see Mitchell W. Berger & Candice D. Tobin, Elec-
tion 2000: The Law of Tied Presidential Elections, 26 NOVA L. REV. 647 (2002) (provid-
ing a thorough analysis of the legal issues following the Florida 2000 election).
97. See also Richard L. Hasen, A Critical Guide to Bush v. Gore Scholarship, AN-
NUAL REV. OF POL. Sci., June 2004, at 4-6, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=491326
(providing background information on Bush v. Gore).
98. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(4)(c) (2000) ("The county canvassing board may authorize
a manual recount.").
99. NORMAN WARD, THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS: REPRESENTATION 243 (2nd
ed. 1963).
100. J. PATRICK BOYER, POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS IN
CANADA 51 (1981).
101. BOYER, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 92, at 893-96; 1067-80.
102. See Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Electronic Voting Systems, 12
A.L.R. 6th 523 (2006) (listing court cases concerning electronic voting machines).
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election.10 3 For example, an electronic voting system's error gave
President Bush 3893 extra votes outside Columbus, Ohio. 10 4 In North
Carolina, more than 4400 votes were lost, necessitating a later special
election. 10 5 In Indiana, a machine miscounted Democratic votes as
Libertarian votes. 10 6 More recently, a California judge voided the re-
sults of a failed ballot initiative because information stored on the
electronic voting machines had been lost.'0 7 The 2006 election also
had problems with electronic voting systems. The Electronic Frontier
Foundation reported problems "wide-ranging in both size and
scope."' 0 8 Aviel D. Rubin, a computer science professor at John Hop-
kins University and an expert on voting machines, told the United
States Election Assistance Commission in May 2004, "[o]n a spectrum
of terrible to very good, we are sitting at terrible."10 9
Various European countries have also experienced problems with
voting machines. In October 2006, weeks before national parliamen-
tary elections, the Dutch interest group "Wij vertrouwen stemcom-
puters niet" ("We Don't Trust Voting Machines") succeeded in hacking
into a voting machine in such a way that it misrepresented the voting
results. It subsequently demonstrated the procedure, which took less
than five minutes, in front of live television cameras. 110 Since the
German town of Cottbus used the same type of voting machines in
local elections at about the same time, the infamous German Chaos
Computer Club ("CC") sent observers to a number of voting stations
and then reported about widespread potential security risks such as
voting machines standing around unsecured prior to the opening of
the voting stations, and insufficiently trained staff unable to recognize
103. Doug Chapin, The Machinery of Democracy: Voting Technology in November
2004, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 553, 554-59 (describing "widespread
problems" with reference to voting technology). See also ARIEL J. FELDMAN, J. ALEX
HALDERMAN & EDWARD W. FELTEN, SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE DIEBOLD AcCUVOTE-TS
VOTING MACHINE (2006), http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/ts-paper.pdf (providing an
independent study of various security risks and problems with these kinds of machines).
104. Chapin, supra note 103, at 557.
105. Id. at 557.
106. Id. at 556.
107. Henry K. Lee, Judge Voids Results of Berkeley Measure on Medical Pot, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 28, 2007, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/
2007/09/28/BA3MSFNNP.DTL.
108. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Voting Machine Headaches Shut
Out Citizens (Nov. 7, 2006), http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2006/11/07-0.
109. Associated Press, Computer Expert: E-Voting Systems Flawed (May 5, 2004),
http://www.kioskmarketplace.com/article.php?id=13571&na=1.
110. Rop GONGGRIJP, WILLIAM-JAN HENGEVELD, ANDRES BOGK, DIRK ENGLING, HAN-
NES MEHNERT, FRANK RIEGER, PASCAL SCHEFFERS & BARRY WELs, NEDAP/GROENENDAAL
ES3B VOTING COMPUTER - A SECURITY ANALYSIS, http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcom-
putersniet.nl/images/9/91/Es3b-en.pdf.
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manipulations of the seals."1 1 The CCC subsequently initiated a peti-
tion to the German Parliament for the abolition of the Federal Regula-
tion on Voting Machines, and thus the legal basis for the use of these
machines. 112 The petition is still pending. Another type of voting ma-
chine, made by the Dutch company SDU, was excluded from the 2006
national elections in the Netherlands because its strong radiation al-
lowed the detection of voter choices with simple technology from as far
away as one hundred feet. i i3
An experiment allowing voters in municipal elections in the
United Kingdom in 2003 to cast their votes via personal computers,
internet, cell phone text message service, tone-dial telephones, inter-
active digital televisions, and voting machines in supermarkets, was
generally considered a failure because of numerous technology break-
downs and many logistical problems. Although one goal of the cam-
paign to bring the elections closer to the citizens was to reverse a slow
decline in voter turnout, the percentage of voters making use of their
right to vote in districts using the new technology ended up 1.5%
lower than in the preceding municipal elections."i 4
There appear to be feasible alternatives to these problematic vot-
ing machines. In recent years several voting stations in Germany
have tested a digital pen that registers, via a kind of camera, the
voter's choice on the paper ballot and transmits it to a central com-
puter. One advantage of this technology is the availability of paper
ballots as a backup in the event of actual or alleged failure or manipu-
lation of the digital technology."i 5 However, the hackers of the CCC
111. Heise online, CCC kritisiert schwere Maingel bei Wahl in Cottbus (Oct. 25,
2006), http:/www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/80022 (providing a report about poten-
tial security risks).
112. Id.
113. Heise online, SDU-Wahlcomputer von niederltindischen Parlamentswahlen
ausgeschlossen (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung80256 (provid-
ing another example of problems with voting machines).
114. See Bryan Mercurio, Democracy in Decline: Can Internet Voting Save the Elec-
toral Process?, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 409 (2004) (discussing the po-
tential of this technology in the United States); Electoral Reform Society, Piloting
Alternative Voting Methods in the 2003 Local Elections in England, http://www.electo-
ral-reform.org.uk/oldsite2007Ol23/publications/briefings/pilotingalternativevoting
methods.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2007) (providing alternative methods for voting); see
also IAN LEIGH, LAw, POLITICS, AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY (2000) (providing a broader cri-
tique of British local democracy).
115. See Digitaler Wahlstift, http://de.wikipedia.orgwiki/DigitalerWahlstift (last
visited Oct. 15, 2007); see also Das Digitale Wahlstift-System, http://fhh.hamburg.de/
stadt/Aktuelllwahl/digitaler_20wahlstiftlstart.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) (explor-
ing elections in Hamburg, Germany). In the United States, several states have con-
ducted tests with voting machines that essentially scan a paper ballot, again preserving
the paper record in addition to the electronic count. See also MELANIE VOLKAMER &
ROLAND VOGT, NEW GENERATION OF VOTING MACHINES IN GERMANY, THE HAMBURG WAY
TO VERIFY CORRECTNESS (2006), http://fee.iavoss.org/2006/papers/fee-2006-iavoss-New-
20071
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even call this technology unsafe because the system is too complex to
be understood by the average person working at the voting stations
and is open, at least potentially, to manipulation by the hardware
manufacturer and/or the software programmers. 1 16 The CCC, there-
fore, keeps demanding that the electronic results should only be used
as preliminary results, and that the final results should always be de-
termined on the basis of a count of the actual paper ballots. 1 17
PARTISAN OFFICIALS
Election officials in the United States are frequently affiliated
with one of the major political parties. 118 Sometimes, this can create
glaring conflicts of interest, as in 2004 when Missouri's Secretary of
State Matt Blunt competed in the gubernatorial race, or when Ohio's
Secretary of State J. Kenneth Blackwell served as co-chair of the Ohio
Bush Re-election Campaign. 1 19 Since the 2000 and 2004 elections
Generation-of-Voting-Machines-in-Germany.pdf (discussing digital pens that scan pa-
per ballots).
116. Von Florian Hanauer, Chaos Computer Club mahnt: Digitaler Wahlstift ist
nicht sicher, WELT ONLINE, Sept. 25. 2007, http://www.welt.de/welt-printlarticlel2ll
107/ChaosComputer_.Club mahntDigitalerWahlstift ist nicht-sicher.html.
117. See also Ted Selker, Fixing the Vote - Electronic Voting Machines Promise to
Make Elections More Accurate than Ever Before, but Only if Certain Problems - With the
Machines and the Wider Electoral Process - Are Rectified, Sci. AM. MAG., Oct., 2004,
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=fLxing-the-vote; Martin L. Haines, Questionable
Machines and the Promise of Chaos, Expect Ddje vu this Election Day, 117 NJLJ 199
(2004); Marjorie Cohn, Paperless Voting in the Presidential Election: Be Very Afraid,
L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 10, 2004, at 6; Roy G. SALTMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS,
ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY IN COMPUTERIZED VOTE-TALLYING (1998); NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
ABOUT ELECTRONIC VOTING (Richard Celeste, Dick Thornburgh & Herbert Lin eds.,
2005).
118. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Elec-
tion Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 974
(2005) (noting that in thirty-three states the chief election officials "are elected through
a partisan election process").
119. Matthew Fox, To be Blunt, Missouri's Election Reeks of Conflicts of Interest and
Warrants a Recount, Oped News, http://www.opednews.com/foxMatthewmissouri.htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2008); Paul Farhi & Jo Becker, Some Fear Ohio will be Florida of
2004, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2006, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/articles/A62645-20040ct25.html. Secretary Blackwell's potentially partisan de-
cisions included:
(1) forbidding individuals from even receiving a provisional ballot unless their
eligibility to vote within the precinct could be confirmed; (2) the refusal to pro-
vide provisional ballots to voters who had requested but claimed not to have
received absentee ballots; (3) declining to count provisional ballots by voters
subject to HAVA's ID requirement, unless they provided their identifying num-
ber or acceptable documentation by the time the polls closed; (4) the initial
decision to allow both pre-election challenges and election day challenges; (5)
the requirement that voter registration forms be rejected if certain information
was omitted; and (6) the rejection of registration forms on less than eighty-
pound paper weight.
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there has been a "widespread perception that party-affiliated election
administrators may have indulged in partisan favoritism during those
elections," which has led to proposals for "the creation of politically
insulated bodies to administer elections." 120
While Canada and the United States have many similarities, a
few institutional differences matter for this discussion of partisanship.
Canada has a tradition of a non-partisan civil service dating back to
1918; reforms of the same era did not reach as far in removing parti-
sanship from the United States' public service. 1 2 1 Moreover, Canada
has more experience with partisan figures functioning in positions re-
quiring a degree of non-partisanship (e.g. Ministers of Justice and
Speakers in the federal and provincial legislatures). Even so, Canada
has generally recognized that only non-partisan officials should make
major decisions in the administration of elections. For example, inde-
pendent commissioners have been responsible for drawing federal
electoral boundaries since 1964; they provide greater fairness and
avoidance of gerrymandering than decisions of state legislatures. 122
However, Canada's system does contain some weaknesses. For
example, returning officers are partisan appointments and, while they
have less discretion than partisan officials in the United States, a
handful of problems has occurred. In 2004, the Chief Electoral Officer
cited thirteen cases of incompetent or unethical behavior by returning
officers. The Chief Electoral Officer asked the government to give him
the authority to hire and fire returning officers, a power he would
have exercised on three occasions.1 23 Bill C-312, which would grant
such authority, was examined by a House of Commons committee and
has the support of most Members of Parliament. 12 4
Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement,
and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1249-50 (2005) (citations
omitted).
120. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An
Overview, 5 ELECTION L.J. 425, 425 (2006). See also David C. Kimball, Martha Kropf &
Lindsay Battles, Helping America Vote? Election Administration, Partisanship, and
Provisional Voting in the 2004 Election, 5 ELECTION L.J. 447, 447 (2006) (finding in the
2004 presidential election "suggestive evidence of partisanship in the selection of state
rules governing the counting of provisional ballots [and] . .. conditional partisan effects
in the casting and counting of provisional ballots").
121. See Kenneth Kernaghan, The Political Rights of Canada's Federal Public Ser-
vants, in DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADA 216-21 (Michael Cas-
sidy ed., 1991) (discussing reforms); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] (discussing non-
partisan civil servants administering elections in Germany); supra notes 30 and accom-
panying text.
122. See WILLIAM E. LYONS, ONE MAN - ONE VOTE, Ch. 2 (1970) (analyzing redis-
tricting by provincial electoral boundary commissions).
123. Tim Naumetz, Let Me Fire Incompetent Returning Officers: Electoral Chief, OT-
TAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 24, 2004, at A3.
124. The bill passed by a vote of 258 to 29 in a second reading on June 22, 2005. See
Parliament of Canada, LEGISinfo, 38th Parliament, First Session, Bill C-312, http:fl
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As others have noted, it may be difficult in the United States to
reach this level of non-partisanship. 12 5 If even the Supreme Court is
perceived as politicized, there may be little chance of a non-partisan
election administration. In addition, even if election administrators
act in good faith, there is the possibility of subconscious partisan
bias. 12 6 Hasen notes, however, given a supermajority requirement for
appointment and the position's high prestige, "there is good rea-
son... to believe nonpartisanship can be achieved by election admin-
istrators," and in fact proposes that the United States adopts a non-
partisan model of senior election administrators like that used in Ca-
nada.' 2 7 For now, the American Bar Association has created a Stand-
ing Committee on Election Law to help ensure that "the voting process
is as fair and democratic as possible." 128 Whether the standing com-
mittee is enough remains to be determined.
ENFORCEMENT
Enforcement of election law in the United States is provided in
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, and the National Voter Registration Act of 1993.129 Although
each state is generally responsible for electoral administration, typi-
www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Lang&Chamber=C&StartList=201&EndList=
1000&Session=13&Type=O&Scope=I&query=4377&List=vote (last visitied Oct. 17,
2007). It did not, however, go through the remaining stages necessary to become law.
See Parliament of Canada, LEGISinfo, 38th Parliament- 1st Session (Oct. 4, 2004-Nov.
29, 2005), http:/www.parl.gc.ca/LEGISINFO/index.asp?Language&Chamber=N&Start
List=A&EndList=Z&Session=13&Type=O&Scope=I&query=4377&List=stat (last vis-
ited Oct. 22, 2007).
125. Hasen, supra note 118, at 986-87. An alternative response to the problem of
partisanship is the creation of "clear rules prescribed in advance" that limit a partisan
official's discretion. Tokaji, supra note 122, at 1249-53.
126. Hasen, supra note 118, at 987.
127. Id. at 987-88. Hasen also evaluates the bipartisan alternative but finds it in-
ferior to the non-partisan model due to an increased risk of deadlock and the potential
unfairness in the selection process. Id. at 989. See also The National Commission on
Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process
(2001), reprinted in 1 ELECTION L.J. 111, 122 (2002) [hereinafter National Commission]
(proposing that states should "consider establishing nonpartisan election commis-
sions"); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Election Commissions and Electoral Reform: An
Overview, 5 ELECTION L.J. 425 (2006) (examining the possible role of independent com-
missions in electoral reform).
128. Robert A. Stein, Guarding the Ballot Box: The Standing Committee on Election
Law Helps Ensure Fairness in Voting, 90 A.B.A. J. 64 (May 2004).
129. Other acts include the Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 90-435, 98 Stat. 1678 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee-1 (2000)),
Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100
Stat. 924 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 39 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.), and Help
America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 15301-15345 (Supp. II 2002)). See also Michael J. Pitts, Defining "Partisan"
Law Enforcement, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REv. 324, 330-35 (2007) (discussing different
kinds of potentially partisan law enforcement decisions).
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cally the federal Department of Justice prosecutes crimes against elec-
toral processes. 130 In addition, the U.S. Attorney General has various
powers, such as the right to have federal officials observe polling
places and ballot tabulation, or to require the provision of non-English
election materials. 13 1 Moreover, the U.S. Attorney General is in-
volved in the enforcement and implementation of other voting-related
acts such as HAVA, and may perhaps administer them in a biased
manner.132
In Canada, much of the responsibility for enforcement of the Elec-
tions Act lies with the Commissioner of Canada Elections, who reports
to the Chief Electoral Officer. This arrangement differs from other
countries' practices because it provides for a single non-partisan offi-
cial who is responsible for enforcing election rules. Most violations are
minor, and compliance agreements have been used since 2000 as a
mechanism for enforcement, particularly for minor violations; it is rec-
ognized that criminal proceedings are not suitable for punishing these
offenses. 133 There were, however, thirty cases of people caught voting
twice in the 2000 election.' 3 4 Most complaints about violations of
election laws relate to finance, sale of alcohol, and the rule allowing
employees a period of time off work to vote. The four Canadian elec-
tions from 1979 to 1988 saw just nine cases of prosecutions for electo-
ral fraud. Cecile Boucher concluded that "[flraud and corruption are
no longer common practice in the election of candidates and par-
ties.' 35 The system of having the power of enforcement in the hands
of non-partisan officials compares favorably with bi-partisan bodies
130. See, e.g., Craig C. Donsanto, Prosecution of Electoral Fraud Under United
States Federal Law, 1558 PLI/CORP 655, 659 (2006) (discussing federal authority over
electoral matters).
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973f(d)(1) (2000) (granting federal officials the right to observe
"whether persons who are entitled to vote are being permitted to vote"); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973f(d)(2) (2000) (granting federal officials the right to observe "whether votes cast
by persons entitled to vote are being properly tabulated"); 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (2000)
(requiring states in some circumstances to provide election materials in the language of
the minority group); 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (2000) (prohibiting states and political sub-
divisions of states from denying a citizen the right to vote "because of his failure to
comply with any test or device").
132. Pitts, supra note 129, at 333 (describing how the DOJ may have been involved
in "partisan 'mission creep'" when it offered "unsolicited advice to state officials on how
to interpret HAVA's provisional ballot requirements").
133. See David M. Brock, Compliance Agreements as an Alternative Enforcement
Mechanism in Canada's Federal Election Law (2005), available at http://cpsa-acsp.ca/
papers-2005/Brock,%20David.pdf (paper for the Canadian Political Science Association
Annual Meeting, London, Ontario).
134. Id. at 18. Many voters may have mistakenly believed they had the right to vote
twice by virtue of owning property in two constituencies.
135. Cecile Boucher, Administration and Enforcement of Electoral Legislation in
Canada, in DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND ELECTORAL REFORM IN CANADA 498 (Michael Cas-
sidy ed., 1991).
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such as the U.S. Federal Election Commission, established to enforce
election finance legislation.
13 6
CANADIAN & EUROPEAN WEAKNESSES: PARTY-RUN
PROCESSES
The Canadian and the German experience show that when the
national government takes charge, general elections can be run
cleanly. Party organizations, however, are responsible for the selec-
tion of candidates for legislative office and party leaders (the rough
equivalent to U.S. primaries), and these processes are less fair. Access
to the votes is restricted to party members in good standing-which in
most cases requires a membership fee-who are often expected to sit
through a two or three hour long meeting. The fee has been criticized
as a poll tax. 137 On occasion there is no nomination vote at all, and
the party leadership appoints a candidate. 138 Canadian and German
parties select their leaders either in delegated conventions or through
"direct" processes that allow all members in good standing to vote.
Convention rules often reserve specific delegate positions for groups
such as women or youth, and in some instances, certain individuals
may be able to vote in more than one delegate selection meeting. This
violates the principle of one person, one vote. 139 Non-citizens or mi-
nors are often permitted to vote.
Delegate selection meetings sometimes feature underhanded tac-
tics. A particularly well-known case involved the recruitment of new
party members from a mission where derelicts lived; they were bussed
to a meeting to select convention delegates. 140 In direct votes of party
members, failure of technology for telephone voting to select leaders
has embarrassed provincial parties on at least two occasions. 14 1 At
136. Robert Pastor, America Observed: Why Foreign Election Observers Would Rate
the United States Near the Bottom, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Dec. 20, 2004. See also
Boucher, supra note 135, at 476-77. The Federal Election Commission was created in
1975 to "[d]isclose campaign finance information, to enforce the provisions of the law
such as the limits and prohibitions on contributions, and to oversee the public funding
of Presidential elections." Federal Election Commission, http://www.fec.gov/about.
shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
137. See J. PATRICK BOYER, POLITICAL RIGHTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS
IN CANADA 30, 32 (1981); WILLIAM CROSS, POLITICAL PARTIES 73-74, 176 (2004).
138. CRoss, supra note 137, at 59-60.
139. Heather MacIvor, The Leadership Convention: An Institution Under Stress, in
LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP IN CANADA 13, 21 (Maureen Mancuso, Richard G. Price &
Ronald Wagenberg eds., 1994).
140. PATRICK MARTIN, ALLAN GREGG & GEORGE AERLIN, CONTENDERS: THE TORY
QUEST FOR POWER 41 (1983).
141. See Ian Stewart, Agar Adamson & Bruce Beaton, Pushing the Right Buttons:
The Nova Scotia Liberals and Tele-Democracy, in ROASTING CHESTNUTS: THE MYTHOL-
OGY OF MARITIME POLITICAL CULTURE 135-54 (Ian Stewart ed., 1994) (discussing the
1992 Nova Scotia Liberal leadership election); Heather MacIvor, Some Reflections on
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other times, members were apparently signed up without their knowl-
edge, with leadership campaign funds paying membership fees, and
the possibility that personal identification numbers would be used by
others. 14 2 Supporters of one leadership candidate may acquire inter-
nal party positions with control of membership forms and thereby re-
strict the ability of opponents to recruit new party members. 143 With
these types of considerations in mind, political scientist Kenneth
Carty has criticized the process, including the reliance on party orga-
nizations and their volunteers to run leadership selection processes
without involvement of the state. He suggests that a hypothetical
team of foreign election observers would object that "Canadians elect a
leader by a process that is uncontrolled by law, open to gross manipu-
lation by the candidates and their teams, and, it seems, large sums of
money are spent to buy and influence votes. We recommend withhold-
ing recognition." 14 4 The contrast with general elections is striking;
despite the importance of these decisions to the public as a whole, par-
ties are treated largely as private organizations with the authority to
manage their own affairs. l4 5
Similar problems with the selection of candidates via internal and
in-transparent party procedures are known to many European democ-
racies. 14 6 However, arguably these problems are not as severe as the
U.S. problems with counting votes on election day because it is still in
the interest of the respective political parties to present the strongest
candidates with the best chances of winning.
Technology and Politics, 19 CAN. PARL. REV. 14-16 (Winter 1997) (describing problems
in provincial leadership selection); DAVID K. STEWART & KEITH ARCHER, QuASI-DEMOC-
RACY? PARTIES AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION IN ALBERTA 68-94 (2000) (discussing the
1994 Liberal leadership election in chapter four, "Electronic Fiasco: The 1994 Liberal
Tele-Votex"). The case of the Alberta Liberal party in 1994 was particularly serious
because, despite the failure to provide a fair process, the result of the vote was allowed
to stand. STEWART ET AL., supra.
142. See, e.g., Dalton Camp, First Came Caesar, Now Comes Long, TORONTO STAR,
Jun. 18, 2000, at A13; see also JUDY TYABJI, POLITICAL AFFAIRS (1994) (providing exam-
ples of claims about provincial cases in chapter 10); Vaughn Palmer, Even in Political
Terms NDP Blows Membership Issue: Recipe for Explosive Dissent with no Offsetting
Benefit: One Riding in Surrey is Equal to 12 in the North and the Interior, VANCOUVER
SUN, Feb. 15, 2000, at A18.
143. CROSS, supra note 137, at 91-92.
144. Kenneth Carty, Remarks in Transparency, Disclosure and Democracy: Assess-
ing the Chief Electoral Officer's Recommendations (Feb. 27, 2002), available at http://
www.irpp.org/miscpubs/archive/030206e.pdf (citations omitted). Laws governing fed-
eral electoral finance have changed, but the remainder of Carty's criticisms continue to
be valid today.
145. A recent exception to the treatment of parties as private organizations is new
regulations concerning finance in constituency nominations and leadership contests.
See CRoss, supra note 137, at 166.
146. For a classic critique of the German system see HANS HERBERT VON ARNIM,
STAAT OHNE DIENER (1993), and REFORM DER PARTEIENDEMOKRATIE (Hans Herbert von
Arnim ed., Berlin 2003).
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In contrast, state-run candidate selection procedures are the
norm in the United States. 14 7 Primaries, defined as "a state-run elec-
tion for the purpose of nominating party candidates to run in the gen-
eral election,' 48 are frequently seen as desirable in "achieving a
representative and corruption-free election system.' 4 9 In addition,
voters in primaries enjoy some constitutional protections.' 50 Al-
though U.S. candidate selection processes are not above criticism, they
are arguably more democratic than the Canadian or German methods.
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS
To support interested developing countries in their efforts at set-
ting up legislative and administrative structures to ensure free and
fair elections, several non-governmental organizations have elabo-
rated international guidelines and best practice standards. The
United States could benefit from careful analysis of these proposals
and from selective implementation of some of the best practice
standards.
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-
tance ("IDEA") is based in Sweden and has been active for decades in
constitution-building and support for the development of electoral
processes around the world.15 ' In a 2002 publication entitled Interna-
tional Electoral Standards - Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal
Framework of Elections, IDEA compiled what it calls "internationally
recognized electoral standards." 152 Different chapters in this volume
147. See, e.g., KEVIN J. COLEMAN, JOSEPH E. CANTOR, THOMAS H. NEALE & GOVERN-
MENT & FINANCE DISION, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PRIMER, 7 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2000), http://www.sen-
ate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL30527.pdf (noting that in 2000 respectively 85.2%
and 90.1% of the Democratic and Republican delegates to their national nominating
conventions would be selected through primaries).
148. Id. at 10.
149. Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth
Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 629, 644 (1991).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 313 (1941) (extending "consti-
tutional protection of the integrity of'elections'" to primaries); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953) (applying the Fifteenth Amendment to pre-primary elections); see also Cal.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572 (2000) (noting that primaries are not
'wholly public affairs that States may regulate freely").
151. See International IDEA: Supporting Democracy Worldwide, http://www.idea.
intlindex.cfm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). Another important contribution in this context
is made by the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, a cooperation project supported by
multiple organizations including Elections Canada, the Mexican Federal Electoral In-
stitute, International IDEA, the United Nations Department for Economic and Social
Affairs (UN-DESA), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). See
ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, http://www.aceproject.org/ (last visited Nov. 4,
2007) (providing extensive links to election-related materials).
152. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE (INTERNA-
TIONAL IDEA), INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR REVIEWING THE
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deal with the recommended constitutional and legislative framework,
the choice of an electoral system, districting and defining boundaries
of electoral units, the right to vote and to be elected, electoral manage-
ment bodies, voter registration and voter registers, rules for electoral
campaigns, media access and media freedom, more and less sensible
rules for campaign finance and expenditure, the actual balloting, vote
counting and tabulating, the role of party representatives during the
balloting process, the possible role of independent election observers,
as well as complaints and challenges. 15 3 Although these guidelines
are intended primarily for developing countries trying to establish a
framework for "good electoral practice," the guidelines are equally
suited for countries considering reforming electoral systems that have
experienced problems. 15 4 Some short remarks shall suffice to per-
suade the reader of their relevance and usefulness in the U.S. context.
Chapter 6 of the guidelines promotes the establishment of "auton-
omous and impartial" electoral management bodies ("EMB"), in par-
ticular for countries where the "neutrality and fairness" of national
and local government officials is not or may no longer be "generally
accepted by the electorate."1 55 One of the principles advocated in this
chapter is the importance of having national and uniform rules pro-
viding for "the size, composition and membership tenure of the EMB,
as well as for the appointment and removal of members," since "these
factors directly affect the independence and impartiality of the
EMB."1 5 6 At the same time, having "party representatives or judges,
who are ultimately appointed by the incumbent party" on an EMB is
strongly discouraged, because it "obviously will impact on an EMB's
independence and impartiality."15 7
Chapter 12 of the guidelines deals with balloting. It begins with
the seemingly uncontroversial principle that "[tihe legal framework
should ensure that polling stations are accessible, that there is accu-
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS (2002) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STAN-
DARDS], available at http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/election-integrity/UNPAN016
077.pdf/view. International IDEA is a non-partisan NGO that promotes sustainable de-
mocracy rather than any particular model of an electoral system. Its basic premise is
that there are various choices countries can make in designing their specific electoral
system, but some choices are more conducive toward sustainable democracy than
others. See also INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE
(INTERNATIONAL IDEA), ELECTORAL MANAGEMENT DESIGN: THE INTERNATIONAL IDEA
HANDBOOK (2006); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE
(INTERNATIONAL IDEA), ENGAGING THE ELECTORATE: INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE VOTER
TURNOUT FROM AROUND THE WORLD (2006).
153. See INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS, supra note 152.
154. Id. at vi.
155. Id. at 37.
156. Id. at 38.
157. Id. at 39.
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rate recording of ballots and that the secrecy of the ballot is guaran-
teed."158 It is fair to blame at least some of the problems in recent
U.S. federal elections on the absence of such a legal framework at the
federal level providing uniform and transparent national rules.
Although IDEA does not come out for or against voting machines,
it does proclaim the principle that "[a] fair, honest and transparent
vote count is a cornerstone of democratic elections," which in turn "re-
quires that votes be counted, tabulated and consolidated in the pres-
ence of the representatives of parties and candidates and election
observers, and that the entire process by which a winner is deter-
mined is fully and completely open to public scrutiny." 159 While this
sounds so obvious that we almost hesitate to spell it out, the system in
the United States could hardly be further away from these principles.
If and when voting machines are used, IDEA requires that "[t]he legal
framework must make possible the independent verification of the ac-
curacy and soundness of hardware and software used for counting bal-
lots. Whether manual, mechanical or electronic counting is used,
overview procedures must be in place to ensure accuracy and reliabil-
ity."160 Again, this does not appear to be the present case in the
United States.
When comparing the electoral system in the United States to in-
ternationally accepted best practice standards-which are 100% en-
dorsed by the United States for adoption by developing countries-
there is a very serious discrepancy. It is, therefore, hardly surprising,
that the United States has been experiencing significant problems
with its elections. If anything, it is surprising that these problems
have arisen only recently and that there has not been more done to
correct them already. Canadians and Europeans, it seems, have ex-
perienced similar difficulties and have found reasonable ways and
means to fix at least the more serious problems-about fifty years ago!
Ultimately, this leaves the question whether the United States is una-
ble to create a better system of voting mechanisms or whether there
158. Id. at 71.
159. Id. at 77. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSIS-
TANCE (INTERNATIONAL IDEA), THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL OBSERVATION
(1999) (examining the subject of independent-and possibly international-election
observers).
160. See INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS, supra note 152, at 78; see also
SHARON J. LASKOWSKI, MARGUERITE AUTRY, JOHN CUGINI, WILLIAM KILLAM & JAMES
YEN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, IMPROVING THE USABILITY
AND ACCESSIBILITY OF VOTING SYSTEMS AND PRODUCTS (2004), http://vote.nist.gov/Final
%20Human%2OFactors%20Report%20%205-04.pdf (providing recommendations that
"should measurably improve" voting systems for all voters, including those with
disabilities).
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are forces in the United States that are unwilling to accept, let alone
promote, a better system.161
161. An unlikely proposition, of course; the international standards and various pro-
posals in the United States demonstrate that this is not exactly rocket science. See, e.g.,
The League of Women Voters of Ohio, A 10-Point Proposal for Election Administration
Reform (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.lwvohio.org/lOPPEARSummary.htm. The League
of Women Voters of Ohio capture the main issues by providing:
1. Absentee voting- Ensure that all persons eligible to vote by absentee
ballot can do so in a timely way.
Overseas voters, those in hospitals, assisted-living facilities and nursing
homes, and non-felons in jail must be informed that they are entitled to vote
and must receive absentee ballots upon request in a timely way. The timing of
absentee ballot application, delivery and return must allow overseas voters to
have their votes counted with all others. Finally, the Ohio Revised Code should
mandate a system for tracking and reporting how all absentee and provisional
ballots are handled.
2. Accessibility: Ensure that voting locations, equipment and instruc-
tions are fully accessible to all voters, including those with disabilities.
Voters with disabilities must be afforded all the information, assistance and
accommodation necessary to comply with state and federal law and to cast
their vote with the same privacy as their non-disabled peers. Elements of ac-
cess include parking, physical access to polling places, adapted voting equip-
ment, seating, restrooms, signage, assistance as legally allowed, and adapted
ballots.
3. County boards of elections: Ensure increased support and assis-
tance to the county boards of elections.
The office of the Secretary of State must address its responsibility to provide
ongoing training and technical assistance to the county boards of elections.
This includes ensuring that at both the state and county levels: all Freedom of
Information and Sunshine laws are observed; that voter registration databases
are properly maintained; and that election equipment vendors act indepen-
dently of political campaigns.
For their part, county boards of elections must ensure citizen participation in
election oversight and appoint ombudsmen to investigate and address the pub-
lic's problems and concerns. In addition, county boards of elections must pro-
vide adequate training and rapid, accurate assistance to their poll workers.
They must provide an effective, transparent voting experience for all. And on
election night, they must verify the accuracy of the ballot tally by publicly
hand-counting randomly selected ballots cast.
4. Impartial election administration: Create an impartial election ad-
ministration system.
The LWVO endorses a nonpartisan system of election administration indepen-
dent of the office of the Secretary of State. An impartial and independent sys-
tem would eliminate the possibility for partisan advantage - and the possibility
of the appearance of partisan advantage - in running Ohio's elections.
5. Poll workers: Improve poll workers' training and experience.
In every precinct across the state of Ohio, poll workers must be actively re-
cruited, thoroughly trained, fully supported for Election Day questions and
problems that arise, and formally appreciated for their service. Poll workers
should be tested on their knowledge of our increasingly complex voting system
prior to Election Day and graded on their Election Day performance.
6. Provisional ballots and voter identification requirements: Ensure
that these two interrelated issues do not prevent eligible voters from
having their ballots counted.
The Ohio Revised Code must be amended to ensure that provisional ballots are
available to all voters who may need them, and that there is uniform treatment
of-and full accountability for-provisional ballots across the state. Provi-
sional ballots are meant to provide a fail-safe way for every voter to cast a
counted vote. Voters must be able to cast a provisional ballot in any precinct in
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CONCLUSION
As Professor Michael Pitts has noted, "[ellections are fundamen-
tally imperfect . . . no matter how many positive reforms we enact,
there will always be a few incredibly close elections that lie 'within the
margin of litigation."'1 6 2 Simply because perfection is an unattainable
goal, however, is no reason for the United States not to attempt im-
provements. The electoral machineries in Canada and in the Euro-
pean Union have evolved enormously. By a combination of accident
and design, these democratic countries have moved from systems full
of unfair and undemocratic elements to ones which, while not perfect,
assure largely fair general elections. Of the electoral machinery's rel-
their county. Furthermore, eligible voters should be able to register on Elec-
tion Day and use a provisional ballot.
Current requirements for voter identification are complex and ambiguous.
These must be clarified or eliminated.
7. Recounts and challenges: Ensure that each recount is honest, accu-
rate and accepted as so.
The Ohio Revised Code must ensure that recount and challenge procedures are
governed by a uniform set of rules and procedures. There must also be ade-
quate security measures for materials and equipment; a minimum 3% random
hand recount provision; and an immediate, appropriate Ohio Supreme Court
review of election challenges. Further, there must be clear procedures allowing
witnesses to view documents and ballots during counts and recounts.
8. Voter education: Ensure that voters are provided with the informa-
tion they need.
Registered voters should receive a full description of where and how to vote,
including: a sample ballot, instructions for early/absentee/provisional voting;
an introduction to their voting machinery; and where to find substantive infor-
mation about candidates and issues. County boards of elections and the Secre-
tary of State should have user-friendly websites offering basic election
information. They should also prepare and distribute educational materials to
special populations such as newly registered voters and students.
9. Voter registration: Ensure timely and accurate voter databases at
both the county and state levels.
The requirements and intent of the national Voting Rights Act and the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA) should be enforced so that the registration process is
fair, accessible and user-friendly.
10. Voting systems and security: Ensure that each voting system pro-
vides an accurate, transparent and secure record of all ballots cast.
Voting systems need to be fiscally feasible, secure, accurate, recountable, acces-
sible, and have the public's trust. Ease of recounts and reliability is essential.
At this time, the optical scan machines appear to be the most capable of meet-
ing these goals and should be adopted statewide. Whichever type of voting sys-
tem is in use, security measures are paramount in the development, testing,
approval, implementation and oversight processes.
Id.
162. Michael J. Pitts, Heads or Tails? A Modest Proposal For Deciding Close Elec-
tions, 39 CoNN. L. REV. 739, 739, 741, 748-51 (2006) (citations omitted) (arguing, appar-
ently only in part tongue-in-cheek, that a coin toss would be a better method of resolving
close elections because it would be less expensive, less partisan and more timely). See
also Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, Practice,
Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 350, 350 (2007) ("Errors will always plague the count-
ing of votes and, periodically, errors will be big enough to undermine the outcome of a
close election."). Both authors accept, however, that improvements to the recount sys-
tem are possible. See Pitts, supra, at 741, n.18; Foley, supra, at 350.
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atively limited problems, few are attributable to partisan actions.
Some possible improvements which could and should be made remain,
such as refining the system for preparing the voter lists and altering
the system of hiring and dismissing returning officers. However, un-
less these countries introduce electronic voting systems on a larger
scale before the technology is sufficiently proven and/or without
backup paper ballots, major problems are unlikely. In particular, it is
virtually impossible that an experience like the Florida recount would
occur in Canada or the European Union. Among the reasons for the
difficulties in Florida were the failure to adequately provide for re-
counts, the time pressures created by the deadline for declaring the
results, the role of courts in delaying recounts and determining what
would be permitted and how it would be done, partisan officials in key
posts, partisan involvement that would be unimaginable in modern
democracies elsewhere, the room for manipulation of voter lists, and
the variation in balloting methods within the country.
With simple paper ballots; relatively clear and uniform standards
in balloting; and centralized, non-partisan authority overseeing the
results, relatively little can go wrong, and fairness to all citizens is
assured. Neither Canada nor the European Union members have
equivalents to butterfly ballots or dimpled chads. Robert Pastor con-
cluded that "[the U.S. electoral system is unquestionably the weakest
in North America," pointing out that the United States could learn
from the way Canada and Mexico administer elections, voter registra-
tion procedures and dealings with technology. 16 3 The U.S. electoral
system is also undoubtedly weaker than the systems in the majority of
the European Union Member States. The United States clearly has
the opportunity to benefit from other countries' electoral experiences.
Whether it has the political will, however, is a very different question.
163. Robert A. Pastor, Improving the U.S. Electoral System: Lessons from Canada
and Mexico, 3 ELECTION L.J. 584, 584 (2004).
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